Interactive proofs model a world where a verifier delegates computation to an untrustworthy prover, verifying the prover's claims before accepting them. These proofs have applications to delegation of computation, probabilistically checkable proofs, crowdsourcing, and more.
INTRODUCTION
Multi-prover interactive proofs (MIP) [10] and rational interactive proofs (RIP) [5] are two important extensions of interactive proof systems.
In a multi-prover interactive proof, several computationally unbounded, potentially dishonest provers interact with a polynomial time, randomized verifier. The provers can pre-agree on a joint strategy to convince the verifier of the truth of a proposition. However, once the protocol starts, the provers cannot communicate with each other. If the proposition is true, the verifier should be convinced with probability 1; otherwise the verifier should reject with some non-negligible probability. As shown by Babai, Fortnow and Lund, MIP = NEXP [8] , which demonstrates the power of multiple provers compared to one-prover interactive proofs (recall that IP = PSPACE [31, 29] ).
Rational interactive proofs [5] are a variant of interactive proofs, where the verifier makes a payment to the prover at the end of the protocol. The prover is assumed to be rational, that is, he only acts in ways that maximize this payment. Thus, in contrast to interactive proofs, the prover does not care whether the verifier is convinced or not. Rational proofs ensure that the prover's payment is maximized if and only if the verifier learns the correct answer to the proposition. Azar and Micali [5] show that, while rational proofs are no more powerful than interactive proofs (i.e., RIP = PSPACE), the protocols are simpler and more efficient. Previous work on rational proofs [6, 5, 25 ] considers a single rational prover.
Many computation-outsourcing applications have ingredients of both of these models: the verifier pays a team of provers based on their responses. For example, in Internet marketplaces such as Amazon's Mechanical Turk [1] and Proof Market [3] , the requesters (verifiers) post laborintensive tasks on the website along with a monetary compensation they are willing to pay. The providers (provers) accept these offers and perform the job. In these Internet marketplaces and crowdsourcing games [33] correctness is often ensured by verifying one provider's answers against another [32, 2] . Thus, the providers collaborate as a teamtheir answers need to match, even though they are likely to not know each other and cannot communicate with each other [27] .
Inspired by these applications and previous theoretical work, we introduce multi-prover rational interactive proofs, which combine elements of rational proofs and classical multi-prover interactive proofs. This model aims to answer the following question: what problems can be solved by a team of rational workers who cannot communicate with each other and get paid based on the joint-correctness of their answers? One of our main contributions is to completely characterize the power of this model.
Previous Work Involving Multiple Rational Provers.
The notion of rational proofs with multiple provers has appeared several times in previous work [5, 6, 25] . However, the authors only use multiple provers to simplify the analysis of single-prover protocols, without formalizing the model. They show that multiple provers in their protocols can be simulated by a single prover by scaling the payments appropriately. Azar and Micali [5] discuss one of the fundamental challenges of using multiple rational provers: in a cooperative setting, one prover may lie to give subsequent provers the opportunity to obtain a larger payment. They pose the following open problem: are multiple provers more powerful than one in rational proofs? In this paper, we show that, in general, a protocol with multiple rational provers cannot be simulated by a single-prover protocol under standard complexity-theoretic assumptions.
The Model of Multi-Prover Rational Proofs.
We briefly summarize our model in order to compare it with the literature and discuss our results. The model is formally defined in Section 2.
In a multi-prover rational interactive proof (MRIP), several computationally-unbounded provers communicate with a polynomial-time randomized verifier who wants to determine the membership of an input string in a language. The provers can pre-agree on how they plan to respond to the verifier's queries. However, they cannot communicate with each other once the protocol begins. At the end of the protocol, the verifier outputs the answer and computes a total payment for the provers based on the input, his own randomness, and the messages exchanged. This total payment may be distributed in any pre-determined way by the verifier or the provers themselves.
A protocol is an MRIP protocol if any strategy of the provers that maximizes their expected payment leads the verifier to the correct answer. The class of languages having such protocols is denoted by MRIP.
Distribution of Payments.
In classical MIP protocols, the provers work collaboratively to convince the verifier of the truth of a proposition and their goal is to maximize the verifier's acceptance probability. Similarly, the rational provers in MRIP work as a team to maximize the total payment received from the verifier. Any pre-specified distribution of this payment is allowed, as long as it does not depend on the transcript of the protocol (i.e., the messages exchanged, the coins flipped, and the amount of the payment). For instance, the division of the payment can be pre-determined by the provers themselves based on the amount of work each prover must perform, or it can be pre-determined by the verifier based on the reputation of each prover. 1 We ignore the choice of division in our model and protocols, as it does not affect the choices made by the provers in deciding their strategy.
Results and Discussions
We state our main results and discuss several interesting aspects of our model.
The Power of Multi-Prover Rational Proofs.
We give tight upper and lower bounds on the power of MRIP protocols. As a warm up, we show that MRIP contains NEXP, using an MIP protocol as a black box and paying the provers appropriately. A similar technique shows that MRIP also contains coNEXP. In fact, an important property of MRIP is that it is closed under complement (Lemma 1). Thus, MRIP is strictly more powerful than RIP (assuming PSPACE = NEXP), resolving the question raised in [5] . Furthermore, MRIP is also more powerful than MIP (assuming NEXP = coNEXP), in contrast to the single-prover case in which classical and rational proofs have the same power. We exactly characterize the class MRIP by showing that a language has a multi-prover rational interactive proof if and only if it is decidable by a deterministic exponential-time oracle Turing machine with non-adaptive access to an NP oracle. That is,
We summarize the power of various models of interactive proofs in Figure 1 . To prove Theorem 1, we (a) provide a new characterization for EXP ||NP , and (b) decompose the circuit family for EXP ||NP obtained from this characterization into three stages, construct MRIP protocols for each stage and combine them together appropriately. A similar 3-stage decomposition was used in [6] , but their technique results in an exponential blow-up in the number of messages when applied to multi-prover protocols.
It is known that any MIP protocol can be simulated using only two provers and one round of communication between the provers and the verifier [15] . Similarly, we show that only two provers and five rounds are sufficient to capture the full power of MRIP. That is, denoting by MRIP(p, r) the class of languages that have p-prover rational proofs with r rounds, we have:
Note that we count the number of rounds as the total number of interactions (provers' messages and verifier's queries are separate rounds), in contrast to the number of pairs of back-and-forth interaction of MIP [15] . We use this convention to simplify our technical discussion.
2 It remains open whether or not the number of rounds in our protocol can be further reduced (see Section 4 for further discussion).
Utility Gaps.
Rational proofs assume that the provers always act to maximize their payment. However, how much do they lose by lying? The notion of utility gaps, first introduced in [6] , measures the loss in payment (or utility) incurred by a lying prover. Notice that a lying prover may (a) deviate (even slightly) from the truthful protocol but still lead the verifier to the correct answer or (b) deviate and mislead the verifier to an incorrect answer. The authors of [6] demanded their protocols to be robust against provers of type (a): that is, any deviation from the prescribed strategy that the verifier intends the provers to follow results in a significant decrease in the payment. This ideal requirement on utility gaps is quite strong, and even the protocol in [6] fails to satisfy it, as pointed out by Guo, Hubáček, Rosen and Vald [25] . In this paper, we consider multi-prover rational proofs robust against cheating provers of type (b) : that is, the provers may respond to some messages of the verifier incorrectly and incur a small payment loss, but if the verifier learns the answer to the membership question of the input string incorrectly, the provers must suffer a significant loss in payment. Note that [25] also considers type (b) utility gap, but for singleprover protocols. Our utility gaps are formally defined in Section 5.
We show that requiring a noticeable utility gap results in protocols for a different, possibly smaller, complexity class. In particular, let poly(n)-gap-MRIP be the class of languages that have MRIP protocols with 1/α(n) utility gap for lying provers, where α(n) is a polynomial in n. We completely characterize this class as the class of languages decidable by a polynomial-time oracle Turing machine with non-adaptive access to an NEXP oracle. That is,
2 Using the convention of [15] , our simulation of any MRIP protocol with two provers would require only three rounds.
Simple and Efficient MRIP protocol for NEXP.
Classical multi-prover interactive proofs for languages in NEXP rely on the MIP protocol for the NEXP-complete language Oracle-3SAT [8] . This MIP protocol is (a) complicated, involving techniques such as multilinearity test of functions and arithmetization, and (b) requires polynomial computation and polynomial rounds of interaction from the verifier. We construct a simple two prover, three round MRIP protocol for Oracle-3SAT using scoring rules.
3 Our protocol is very efficient: the verifier performs linear computation along with constant number of basic arithmetic operations to calculate the reward.
Contrasting MRIP with Other Relevant Models.
Existing models, such as refereed games, MIP, and singleprover rational proofs all differ from MRIP in distinct and potentially interesting ways.
Refereed games [17] are interactive proof models consisting of two competing provers, who try to convince the verifier of the membership (or non-membership) of a given input string in a language. However, one of them is honest and the other is not. The model of refereed games reflects the strategic nature of the provers, but does not allow collaboration between them.
Classical multi-prover interactive proofs are robust against arbitrary collaborative provers, who may be irrational or even malicious. While MIP protocols provide a stronger guarantee, they are often complicated and computationally-intensive (require polynomial-work from the verifier). In contrast, MRIP restricts provers to be rational, a reasonable assumption in a "mercantile world", as pointed out in [5] . This restriction leads to simple and efficient protocols for the single-prover case [6, 25] , making rational proofs a meaningful and interesting model to study.
Finally, MRIP achieves its full power with only five rounds of interaction between the verifier and the provers. In contrast, RIP is less powerful when restricted to constant rounds. 4 
Additional Related Work
Interactive Proofs.
First introduced by Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff [23] and in a different form by Babai and Moran [7] , interactive proofs (IP) have been extensively studied (see, e.g., [22, 8, 10, 9, 23, 19, 20, 24] ) and precisely characterized: that is, IP = PSPACE [31, 29] . Ben-Or et al. [10] introduced multiprover interactive proofs (MIP), which were shown to be exactly equal to NEXP [8] . In fact, two provers and one round is sufficient; in other words, NEXP = MIP(2, 1) [15] .
Rational Proofs.
Azar and Micali [5] use scoring rules in a novel way to construct simple and efficient single-prover rational protocols. The prover is assumed to be sensitive to exponentially small losses in payment, that is, a negligible utility gap is a sufficient punishment for the prover. In [6] , the same authors proposed the idea of utility gaps and constructed super-efficient rational proofs, where the verifier performs only logarithmic computation. Guo, Hubáček, Rosen and Vald [25] studied rational arguments, which are rational proofs with a single computationally-bounded prover. They constructed rational arguments with single-round interaction and sublinear verification for NC 1 . They also mentioned that a rational proof model with multiple provers may have interesting implications in computation delegation schemes, but did not define such a model. Later, they extended their rational argument protocols to P [26] , via a novel technique called rational sumcheck.
Game-Theoretic Characterization of Complexity Classes.
Game-theoretic characterization of complexity classes has been largely studied in the form of refereed games [12, 17, 14, 16, 30, 18, 28] .
The classic work of Chandra and Stockmeyer [12] proved that any language in PSPACE is refereeable by a game of perfect information. Feige and Kilian [14] show this is tight for single-round refereed games and that the class of languages with polynomial-round refereed games is exactly EXP.
Feigenbaum, Koller and Shor [18] study a related complexity class EXP NP and show that it can be simulated as a zero-sum refereed game between two computationally unbounded provers with imperfect recall. Note that imperfect recall is a very strong assumption and makes the computationally unbounded provers essentially act as oracles. In contrast, MRIP consists of collaborative provers having imperfect information (since a prover does not see the messages exchanged between the verifier and other provers) and perfect recall (since a prover remembers the history of messages he exchanged with the verifier). Notice that imperfect information is necessary for multi-prover protocols: if all provers can see all messages exchanged in the protocol, then the model degenerates to a single-prover case. Moreover, perfect recall gives the provers the ability to cheat adaptively across messages. With these differences, MRIP is equivalent to EXP ||NP . To our best knowledge, this is the first gametheoretic characterization of this complexity class.
It is worth pointing out that EXP NP is also an important class in the study of circuit lower bounds [34] . It would be interesting to see if the related complexity class EXP ||NP emerges in similar contexts.
Outline of the paper
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we define the class of languages that have multi-prover rational interactive proofs, MRIP, and discuss some of its properties. We construct MRIP protocols for NEXP in the same section. We characterize the class MRIP in Section 3. In Section 4 we show how to simulate any MRIP protocol with two provers and five rounds. Finally, in Section 5 we define the notion of utility gap and characterize the power of MRIP protocols with a polynomial utility gap.
MULTI-PROVER RATIONAL INTER-ACTIVE PROOFS
In this section we define the model of multi-prover rational interactive proofs and demonstrate several important properties of the class of languages recognized by these proofs.
First, we describe how the verifier and the provers interact, and introduce necessary notations on the way. Let L be a language, x a string whose membership in L is to be decided, and n = |x|. An interactive protocol is a pair (V, P ), where V is the verifier and P = (P1, . . . , P t(n) ) is the vector of provers, with t(n) a polynomial. 5 The verifier runs in polynomial time and flips private coins, whereas each Pi is computationally unbounded. The verifier and provers all know x. The verifier can communicate with each prover privately, but no two provers can communicate with each other. In a round, either each prover sends a message to the verifier, or the verifier sends a message to each prover, and these two cases alternate. Without loss of generality we assume the first round of messages are sent by the provers, and the first bit sent by P1, denoted by c, indicates whether x ∈ L (corresponding to c = 1) or not (c = 0). Notice that c does not depend on the randomness used by V .
The length of each message and the number of rounds are polynomial in n. Let p(n) be the number of rounds and r the random string used by V . For each j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , p(n)}, let mij be the message exchanged between V and Pi in round j. In particular, the first bit of m11 is c. The transcript that each prover Pi has seen at the beginning of each round j is (mi1, mi2, . . . , m i(j−1) ). Let m be the vector of all messages exchanged in the protocol (therefore m is a random variable depending on r).
At the end of the communication, the verifier computes a payment function R based on x, r, and m as the total payment to give to the provers. We restrict R(x, r, m) ∈ [−1, 1] for convenience. The protocol followed by V , including the payment function R, is public knowledge.
The verifier outputs c as the answer for the membership of x in L: that is, V does not check the provers' answer and follows it blindly. As will become clear from our results, this requirement for the verifier does not change the set of languages that have multi-prover rational interactive proofs. Indeed, we could have allowed V to compute his answer based on x, r, and m as well, but the current model eases later discussion on the payment loss of the provers caused by "reporting a wrong answer".
Each prover Pi can choose a strategy sij : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} * for each round j, which maps the transcript he has seen at the beginning of round j to the message he sends in that round. 7 Letsi = (si1, . . . , s ip(n) ) be the vector of strategies Pi uses in rounds 1, . . . , p(n), ands = (s1, . . . ,s t(n) ) be the strategy profile of the provers. Given any input x, randomness r, and strategy profiles, we denote by (V, P )(x, r,s) the vector of all messages exchanged in the protocol.
The provers are cooperative and jointly act to maximize the (total) expected payment received from the verifier. Note that this is equivalent to the provers maximizing their own expected payment when each prover receives a prespecified division of the payment, that is, for any function γi fixed at the beginning of the protocol with n i=1 γi = 1, Pi receives γiR. 5 That is, we allow polynomially many provers. 6 Note that the payment can be shifted and scaled so that it is in [0, 1]. We use both positive and negative payments in our model to better reflect the intuition behind our protocols: the former are rewards while the latter are punishments. 7 Pi does not send any message sij for an even-numbered round j, and these sij's can be treated as constant functions.
Thus, before the protocol starts, the provers pre-agree on a strategy profiles that maximizes
When (V, P ) and x are clear from the context, we write u(s) for u (V, P ) (s; x). Using the above notions, we define MRIP as follows.
Definition 1 (MRIP).
For any language L, an interactive protocol (V, P ) is a multi-prover rational interactive proof (MRIP) protocol for L if, for any x ∈ {0, 1} * and any strategy profiles of the provers such that u(s) = maxs u(s ), we have 1. u(s) ≥ 0; 2. c = 1 if and only if x ∈ L. We denote the set of languages that have MRIP protocols by MRIP, and the set of languages that have MRIP protocols with k provers and p rounds by MRIP(k, p).
Proof. Let L be a language in MRIP, (V, P ) an MRIP protocol for L, and R the payment function computed by V . We construct a verifier V and thus an MRIP protocol (V , P ) for L, as follows.
• V runs V to compute the messages he should send in each round, except that, whenever V gives V as an input the first message m 11 sent by P1, he flips the first bit.
• At the end of the communication, V computes a payment function R : for any x, r, and m , R (x, r, m ) = R(x, r, m), where m is m with the first bit flipped.
• V outputs the first bit sent by P1. For each strategy profiles of the provers in the protocol (V, P ), consider the following strategy profiles in the protocol (V , P ):
•s i =si for each i = 1.
• In round 1,s 1 outputs the same message ass1, except that the first bit is flipped.
• For any odd number k > 1 and any transcript m 1 for P1 at the beginning of round k,s 1 (m 1 ) is the same as s1(m1), where m1 is m 1 with the first bit flipped. It is easy to see that for any x and r, (V , P )(x, r,s ) is the same as (V, P )(x, r,s) except the first bit. Thus R (x, r, (V , P )(x, r,s )) = R(x, r, (V, P )(x, r,s)), which implies
Also, it is easy to see that the mapping froms tos is a bijection. Accordingly, arbitrarily fixing a strategy profiles that maximizes u (V , P ) (s ; x), we have that the correspondings maximizes u (V, P ) (s; x) as well. Thus
where the inequality is by Definition 1. Furthermore, x ∈ L if and only if the first bit sent bys1 is 1, if and only if the first bit sent bys 1 is 0. That is, x ∈ L if and only if the first bit sent bys 1 is 1.
To demonstrate the power of multi-prover rational proofs, we show that MRIP contains NEXP. With Lemma 1, this implies that MRIP contains coNEXP as well. We show this in two different ways.
First, we construct an MRIP protocol for any language in NEXP using a standard MIP protocol as a subroutine. Given existing MIP protocols, this method is intuitive and its correctness is easy to see. However, the computation and communication complexity of the protocol depends on the MIP protocol.
Second, we construct an MRIP protocol for an NEXPcomplete language without relying on MIP protocols, instead by exploiting the rational nature of the provers. This protocol uses proper scoring rules to incentivize the provers. In contrast to MIP, this MRIP protocol is very efficient: it only requires the verifier to perform linear amount of computation and communication, along with computing the payment using constant number of arithmetic operations.
An MRIP Protocol for any Language in
NEXP, Based on MIP.
An MIP protocol (see, e.g., [8, 15] ) for a language L ∈ NEXP first reduces L to the NEXP-complete problem Oracle-3SAT (defined below), and then runs an MIP protocol for Oracle-3SAT.
Definition 2 (Oracle-3SAT [8] ). Let w be a binary string of length r + 3s. Let B be a 3-CNF of r + 3s + 3 variables. A Boolean function A : {0, 1} s → {0, 1} is a 3-satisfying oracle for B if B(w, A(b1), A(b2), A(b3)) is satisfied for all w, where b1b2b3 are the last 3s bits of w. The Oracle-3SAT problem is to decide, for a given B, if there is a 3-satisfying oracle for B.
Our MRIP protocol for NEXP uses a black-box MIP protocol and an appropriate payment scheme.
Proof. The MRIP protocol (V, P ) for L is shown in Figure 2 . By construction, the payment to the provers is always non-negative. Now we show that V outputs 1 if and only if x ∈ L. On the one hand, for any x ∈ L, if the provers send c = 1 and execute the MIP protocol with V , then their payment is R = 1; 8 while if they send c = 0, the payment is R = 1/2 < 1. Accordingly, their best strategy profile is to send c = 1 and run the MIP protocol correctly. On the other hand, for any x ∈ L, if the provers send c = 1 and run the MIP protocol, then by the definition of MIP, the probability that V accepts is at most 1/3, and the expected payment is at most 1/3; while if they send c = 0, the payment is 1/2 > 1/3. Accordingly, their best strategy profile is to send c = 0. Remark 1. Since any language L ∈ NEXP has a 2-prover 1-round MIP protocol [15] , we automatically obtain an MRIP protocol for L with 2 provers and 3 rounds of interaction (using our convention, executing the MIP protocol takes 2 rounds, plus one round for the answer bit c). Note that this is the best possible. However, the computation and communication complexity of the protocol are both polynomial (in addition to the reduction to Oracle-3SAT) and involve complex techniques such as arithmetization and multilinearity test [8] . 8 If the MIP protocol does not have perfect completeness and accepts x with probability at least 2/3, then the expected payment is at least 2/3. However, this does not affect the correctness of the MRIP protocol.
For any input string x, the protocol (V, P ) works as follows:
1. P1 sends a bit c to V . V outputs c at the end of the protocol. 2. If c = 0 then the protocol ends and the payment given to the provers is R = 1/2; 3. Otherwise, V and P run an MIP protocol for proving x ∈ L. If the verifier accepts then R = 1, else R = 0. By Lemmas 1 and 2, we immediately have the following corollary. Also note that we can obtain a 2-prover 3-round MRIP protocol for coNEXP directly by modifying the protocol of Lemma 2.
NEXP, Using Scoring Rules.
We now construct an MRIP protocol for any language in NEXP without relying on MIP protocols. Instead, we use proper scoring rules to compute the payment that should be given to the provers so as to ensure truthful answers.
To begin, we recall the definitions of proper scoring rules in general and the Brier's scoring rule in particular, which has been an essential ingredient in the construction of rational proofs [5, 6, 25] .
Proper Scoring Rules.
Scoring rules are tools to assess the quality of a probabilistic forecast by assigning a numerical score (that is, a payment to the forecaster) to it based on the predicted distribution and the sample that materializes. More precisely, given any probability space Σ, letting ∆(Σ) be the set of probability distributions over Σ, a scoring rule is a function from ∆(Σ) × Σ to R, the set of reals. A scoring rule S is proper if, for any distribution D over Σ and distribution
where D(ω) is the probability that ω is drawn from D. A scoring rule S is strictly proper if the above inequality is strict. Notice that, when the true distribution is D, the forecaster maximizes the expected payment under a strictly proper scoring rule by reporting D = D. For a comprehensive survey on scoring rules, see [21] .
Brier's Scoring Rule [11] .
This classic scoring rule, denoted by BSR, is defined as follows: for any distribution D and ω ∈ Σ,
It is well known that BSR is strictly proper. Notice that BSR requires the computation of ω∈Σ D(ω) 2 , which can be hard when |Σ| is large. However, similar to [5, 25] , in this paper we only consider Σ = {0, 1}. Also notice that, BSR has range [−2, 0] and can be shifted and scaled so that (1) the range is non-negative and bounded, and (2) the resulting scoring rule is still strictly proper. In particular, we shall add 2 to the function when using it.
Next, we construct a simple and efficient MRIP protocol for Oracle-3SAT. Similar to the classical multi-prover case, an MRIP protocol for any language L ∈ NEXP can be obtained by first reducing L to Oracle-3SAT, and then using our efficient MRIP protocol for Oracle-3SAT. The complexity of the overall protocol for L is thus the same as the reduction.
Lemma 3. Oracle-3SAT has an MRIP protocol with 2 provers and 3 rounds where, for any instance B of length n, the randomness used by the verifier, the computation complexity, and the communication complexity of the protocol are all O(n), and the computation of the payment function consists of constant number of arithmetic operations over O(n)-bit numbers.
Proof. For any instance B with r +3s+3 variables (thus n ≥ r + 3s + 3), the provers can, with their unbounded computation power, find an oracle A * that maximizes the number of satisfying w's for B. Denote this number by a * . If B ∈ Oracle-3SAT then a * = 2 r+3s , otherwise a * < 2 r+3s . Roughly speaking, in our MRIP protocol (V, P ), the verifier incentivizes the provers to report the correct value of a * , so that the membership of B can be decided. The protocol is shown in Figure 3 .
To see why this protocol works, first notice that, if the provers send c = 0 and a = 0 in Step 1 and always send 0's in Step 4, then the protocol always ends in Steps 5b or 5c, and the provers' expected payment is 0. Accordingly, the best strategy profiles * of the provers gives them expected payment at least 0, and Condition 1 of Definition 1 holds. Moreover,s * must be such that either c = 1 and a = 2 r+3s , or c = 0 and a < 2 r+3s ,
since otherwise the provers' expected payment is −1. It remains to show that Condition 2 of Definition 1 holds. Notice that P2 only answers one query of the verifier (in step 4), thus under any strategys2 and given any c and a, P2 de facto commits to an oracle A : {0, 1} s → {0, 1}. Assume that P1, using a strategys1 and seeing (b1, ..., b6), sends V six bits in step 4 that are not consistent with A -that is, there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , 6} such that A(bi) = A (bi). Let q be the probability that, conditioned on (b1, ..., b6), the verifier chooses a k that catches the provers in step 5a. We have q ≥ 1/6. Let R be the payment to the provers conditioned on (b1, ..., b6) and on the event that they are not caught in step 5a. Note that R ≤ 2 11 by the definition of Brier's scoring rule (after shifting and scaling). Thus the expected payment to the provers conditioned on (b1, ..., b6) is −q + (1 − q)R < 0. However, if P1 answers the verifier's queries consistently with A , his expected payment conditioned on (b1, ..., b6) is non-negative. Accordingly, the best strategy profiles * must be such that, for any c, a, and the oracle commited by P2, P1's answers for any (b1, ..., b6) are consistent with A . Thus unders * the payment is never computed in step 5a. Furthermore, given b1, b2, b3 and A , whether B evaluates to 0 in step 5b or not is totally determined. If B evaluates to 0, then it does not matter what a or c is and the provers' received payment is 0. If B does not evaluate to 0 in step 5b, then the expected payment to the provers in step 5c is defined by Brier's scoring rule: the true distribution of b, denoted by D, is such that D(1) = a /2 r+3s , with a being the number of satisfying w's for B under oracle A ; and the realized value is b = B(z , b4, b5, b6, A(b4), A(b5), A(b6)). Indeed, since b4, b5, b6 are independent from b1, b2, b3, we have that w is a uniformly random input to B, and the probability for b to be 1 is exactly a /2 r+3s . Since Brier's scoring rule is strictly proper, conditioned on A the provers maximize their expected utility by reporting
which implies (p1, p0) = (D(1), D(0)). If B ∈ Oracle-3SAT, then no matter which oracle A is committed unders * , we have a < 2 r+3s . By Equations 1 and 2, we have a < 2 r+3s and c = 0, as desired. If B ∈ Oracle-3SAT, we show that unders * the prover P2 commits to the desired 3-satisfying oracle A * (so that a = 2 r+3s and D(1) = 1). To see why this is true, denote by BSR(D) the expected score for reporting D under Brier's scoring rule, when the true distribution is D. We have If there is no oracle A such that a = 0 given A , then the only way for the provers to maximize their expected payment is to commit to the 3-satisfying oracle A * (thus a = 1), under which step 5c is reached with probability 1. Again by Equations 1 and 2, we have c = 1 and a = 2 r+3s as desired.
If there is both a 3-satisfying oracle A * and an oracle A such that a = 0, we need to make sure that P2 does not commit to A : indeed, committing to any other oracle results in an expected payment strictly smaller than that by committing to A * , since it increases the probability that the protocol ends at step 5b with R = 0, and strictly decreases the expected payment conditioned on step 5c being reached. If P2 commits to A , then B always evaluates to 0 in step 5b, and step 5c is actually never reached. Thus, even though by committing to A the provers maximize their expected payment in step 5c, their actual expected payment is 0. Instead, by committing to A * , step 5c is reached with probability 1 and the provers get positive payment. Accordingly, the strategy profiles * must be such that P2 commits to A * and P1 sends a = 2 r+3s and c = 1, as desired. Notice that if there are multiple 3-satisfying oracles for B, then the provers can pre-agree on any one of them.
In sum, Condition 2 of Definition 1 also holds and (V, P ) is an MRIP protocol for Oracle-3SAT. Moreover, since n ≥ r+3s+3, it is easy to see that the number of coins flipped by V is at most 2n (for sampling w, w , and k) and the number of bits exchanged between V and P is at most 3n+3. Finally, given an input string w = (z, b1, b2, b3) for B and the 3-bit answers of the oracle for b1, b2, b3, B can be evaluated in linear time, thus the running time of V is O(n) plus constant number of arithmetic operations to compute the payment in step 5c. Therefore Lemma 3 holds.
CHARACTERIZING MULTI-PROVER RATIONAL INTERACTIVE PROOFS
In this section we prove Theorem 1, that is,
We first show that MRIP is the same as another complexity class, EXP ||poly−NEXP , which we define below. We complete the proof of Theorem 1 by showing EXP ||NP = EXP ||poly−NEXP .
Definition 3. EXP ||poly−NEXP is the class of languages decidable by a deterministic exponential-time Turing machine with non-adaptive access to an NEXP oracle, such that the length of each oracle query is polynomial in the length of the input of the Turing machine.
We use two intermediate lemmas to prove the lower bound. Lemma 4 is from [4] and gives a circuit characterization of EXP. . Lemma 5. Every language L in EXP has an MRIP protocol with two provers and five rounds.
Lemma 4 ([4]).
Proof. To begin, we recall some definitions and results from the literature that we use in our proof. First of all, a circuit family {Cn} ∞ n=1 is a sequence of boolean circuits such that Cn : {0, 1} n → {0, 1}. The gates in the circuits are of type AND, OR, and NOT, with fan-ins 2, 2, and 1 respectively. The input string to a circuit is connected to a special set of "input gates", one for each bit of the input, whose output value is always the value of the corresponding bit. The size of a circuit C is the number of gates (including the input gates) in C. For a circuit C of size g, the set of gates in it is denoted by {1, 2, ..., g}. Without loss of generality we assume that gate g is the output gate of the whole circuit. Moreover, if C has input length n, without loss of generality we assume that gates 1, 2, .., n are the input gates. Notice that the number of wires in C is at most 2g, since each gate has at most 2 fan-ins. The set of wires is denoted by {1, 2, ..., 2g}.
Definition 4 (DC uniform circuits [4]).
A circuit family {Cn} ∞ n=1 is a Direct Connect uniform (DC uniform) family if the following questions can be answered in polynomial time:
1. SIZE(n): what is the size of Cn? 2. IN P U T (n, h, i): is wire h an input to gate i in Cn? 3. OU T P U T (n, h, i): is wire h the output of gate i in Cn?
For any instance B, the protocol (V, P ) works as follows: 1. P1 sends c ∈ {0, 1} and a ∈ {0, . . . , 2 r+3s } to V . V always outputs c at the end of the protocol. 2. If c = 1 and a < 2 r+3s , or if c = 0 and a = 2 r+3s , the protocol ends with payment R = −1. 3. Otherwise, V randomly chooses two binary strings of length r + 3s, w = (z, b1, b2, b3) and w = (z , b4, b5, b6), as well as a number k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}. V sends b1, b2, b3, b4, b5, b6 to P1 and b k to P2. 4. P1 sends to V six bits, A(bi) with i ∈ {1, 2, ..., 6}, and P2 sends one bit, A (b k ). 5. The protocol ends and V computes the payment R as follows. 
T Y P E(n, i, t): is t the type of gate i in Cn?
That is, the circuits in a DC uniform family may have exponential size, but they have a succinct representation in terms of a polynomial-time Turing machine that can answer all the questions in Definition 4. The class EXP can be characterized by the class of DC uniform circuit families [4] ; this is stated formally in Lemma 4. Now we are ready to prove Lemma 5. Following Lemma 4, there exists a DC uniform circuit family {Cn} ∞ n=1 that computes L. Let g = 2 n k be the size of each Cn, where k is a constant that may depend on L. For any input string x of length n and any gate i ∈ {1, 2, ..., g} in Cn, let vi(x) ∈ {0, 1} be the value of i's output on input x. In particular, vi(x) = xi for any i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}. We call a gate i in Cn an input gate of i if there is a directed wire from i to i. The MRIP protocol (V, P ) is shown in Figure 4 .
Clearly this protocol has two provers and five rounds. To see why it is an MRIP protocol, notice that if P1 and P2 always send the correct c and answer V 's queries correctly according to Cn, their received payment is always R = 1, irrespective of V 's coin flips. Thus the expected received payment is 1. Below we show that any other strategy profile gives expected payment strictly less than 1.
First of all, when the gate i chosen by the verifier in step 2 is not an input gate, if any of P1's answers in step 3 to queries 2a and 2b (namely, about i's type, input gates and input wires) is incorrect, then the verification in step 6a fails, giving the provers a payment R = 0. Accordingly, if there exists such a gate then the expected payment to the provers is at most 1 − 1/g < 1. Similarly, if there exists a non-input gate i such that P1 answers queries 2a and 2b correctly but the values vi(x), vi 1 (x), vi 2 (x) are inconsistent with i's type, then, when i is chosen, step 6b fails, thus the expected payment to the provers is at most 1 − 1/g < 1. Moreover, if there exists an input gate i such that vi(x) = xi when i is chosen, or if vg(x) = c when gate g is chosen, then the expected payment to the provers is again at most 1 − 1/g < 1.
Next, similar to the analysis of Lemma 3, P2 is only queried once (in step 5). Thus P2 de facto commits to an oracle A : {1, . . . , g} → {0, 1}, which maps any gate to its value under input x. If there exists a gate i such that the values vi(x), vi 1 (x), vi 2 (x) in step 3 are not consistent with A, then, conditioned on i being chosen in step 2, with probability 1/3 step 6e fails. Since i is chosen with probability 1/g, the expected payment is at most 1 − 1 3g < 1. Accordingly, the only strategy profiles that can have expected payment equal to 1 is exactly what we want: that is,
(1) P1 and P2 answer queries to the values of gates using the same oracle A : {1, . . . , g} → {0, 1}, (2) A(i) = xi for any input gate i, Using these lemmas, Lemma 6 proves the lower bound on MRIP. We describe the main ideas in the proof sketch below. A detailed proof can be found in the full version of this paper [13] .
Proof Sketch: Using the characterization of EXP in terms of DC uniform circuits from Lemma 4, we have an MRIP protocol for EXP with 2 provers and 5 rounds as in Lemma 5 (see Figure 4) . We then combine this protocol with the MRIP protocol for Oracle-3SAT in Figure 2 to obtain the desired MRIP protocol for EXP ||poly−NEXP . 9 In particular, we use the protocol for Oracle-3SAT to answer NEXP oracle queries. A similar structure has been used by [6] for single-prover rational proofs. However, the prover in [6] can send the entire proof of a circuit satisfiability problem to the verifier, which is not feasible for us because our circuit may be exponentially large while our verifier is still of polynomial time. We overcome this problem by using a second prover to cross-check whether the first prover is answering questions about the circuit correctly.
Lemma 7 then shows that the above lower bound is tight, leading to an exact characterization.
Given any string x of length n, 1. P1 sends one bit c ∈ {0, 1} to V . V always outputs c at the end of the protocol. 2. V computes g = SIZE(n), picks a gate i ∈ {1, 2, ..., g} uniformly at random, and sends i to P1. That is, V queries P1 for: (a) the type of gate i, (b) the input gates of i and corresponding input wires, and (c) the values of gate i and its input gates. 3. P1 sends to V the concatenation of the following strings: type ti ∈ {AN D, OR, N OT }; gates i1, i2 ∈ {1, 2, ..., g}; wires h1, h2 ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2g}; and values vi(x), vi 1 (x), vi 2 (x) ∈ {0, 1}. 4. V picks a gate i ∈ {i, i1, i2} uniformly at random and sends i to P2. 5. P2 sends v i (x) ∈ {0, 1} to V . 6. The protocol ends and V computes the payment R by verifying the following statements:
(a) If i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} (that is, i is not an input gate), then T Y P E(n, i, ti) = 1, IN P U T (n, h1, i) = OU T P U T (n, h1, i1) = 1, and, if ti = N OT , IN P U T (n, h2, i) = OU T P U T (n, h2, i2) = 1. (b) If i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, then vi(x) is computed correctly based on type ti from vi 1 (x) and (when ti = N OT ) vi 2 (x). Proof. Arbitrarily fix a language L ∈ MRIP and let (V, P ) be an MRIP protocol for L. Since V runs in polynomial time, there exists a constant k such that, for any two payments R and R that can be output by V under some input of length n and some randomness, we have
For example, n k can be an upper bound of V 's running time. Moreover, since V uses polynomially many random coins, there exists another constant k such that, when a payment appears with positive probability under some input of length n, it must appear with probability at least 1 2 n k . Accordingly, for any input x of length n and any two strategy profiless ands of the provers, if the expected payments u(s; x) and u(s ; x) are different, then
Consider the following deterministic oracle Turing machine M : Given any input x of length n, it divides the Notice that the lengths of the queries are upper bounded by 2 + n k+k , which is a polynomial as required by the class EXP ||poly−NEXP . For each query (i, j), if j = 0 then the corresponding question is "whether there exists a strategy profiles of the provers such that u(s; x) is in the i-th interval"; and if j = 1 then the corresponding question is "whether there exists a strategy profiles such that u(s; x) is in the i-th interval and the first bit sent by P1 is c = 1". Notice that all the queries are indeed non-adaptive. We say that interval i is non-empty if the query (i, 0) is answered 1, and empty otherwise.
Assume for now all the queries are answered correctly. M finds the highest index i * such that the interval i * is non-empty. It accepts if (i * , 1) is answered 1, and rejects otherwise. M clearly runs in exponential time. To see why it decides L (given correct oracle answers), notice that by Definition 1, there exists a strategy profile whose expected payment is non-negative and thus in [0, 1] (since the payment is always in [−1, 1]). Thus there exists an interval i such that (i, 0) is answered 1. Also by definition, the best strategy profiles has the highest expected payment, and thus u(s; x) falls into interval i * . By Inequality 3, any strategy profiles with u(s ; x) < u(s; x) has u(s ; x) not in interval i * , since the difference between u(s ; x) and u(s; x) is larger than the length of the interval. Accordingly, all strategy profiless with u(s ; x) in interval i * satisfies u(s ; x) = u(s; x): they are all the best strategy profiles of the provers. Again by Definition 1, P1 sends the same first bit c under all these strategy profiles, c = 1 if and only if x ∈ L, and there does not exist any other strategy profile whose expected payment falls into interval i * but the first bit sent by P1 is different from c. Thus the answer to (i * , 1) always equals c, and M accepts if and only if c = 1, if and only if x ∈ L, as desired.
It remains to show that the oracle queries can be answered by an NEXP oracle. Recall that in the protocol (V, P ) a strategy sij of each prover Pi for each round j is a function mapping the transcript Pi has seen at the beginning of round j to the message he sends in that round. Since the protocol has polynomially many provers and polynomially many rounds, by definition a strategy profile consists of polynomially many functions from {0, 1}
* to {0, 1} * , where for each function both the input length and the output length are polynomial in n (since otherwise the messages cannot be processed by V ). Accordingly, it takes exponentially many bits to specify each function: if the input length is p(n) and the output length is q(n), then 2 p(n) q(n) bits are sufficient to specify the truth table of the function. Therefore a strategy profile can also be specified by exponentially many bits. Below we construct an exponential-time non-deterministic Turing machine M that decides the questions corresponding to the queries.
Given any input (i, 0), M non-deterministically chooses a strategy profiles, in exponential time. It then goes through all the realizations of V 's random string, and for each realization r it runs V with x and r, and generates the provers' messages by looking them up in the corresponding truth table ins. M computes for each r the payment output by V at the end of the protocol, and by combining these payments with corresponding probabilities M computes the expected payment u(s; x). If u(s; x) is in interval i then M accepts, otherwise it rejects. Since V 's random string is polynomially long, there are exponentially many realizations, and each one of them takes exponential time to run: V runs in polynomial time and it takes M exponential time to look up the truth tables ins to generate a prover's message. Thus M runs in non-deterministic exponential time. Also, if interval i is non-empty then there exists a strategy profiles that makes M accept, and if interval i is empty then M always rejects.
Similarly, given any input (i, 1), M non-deterministically chooses a strategy profiles and computes its expected payment u(s; x). If u(s; x) is not in interval i then M rejects; otherwise, M accepts if and only if the first bit sent by P1 is 1. The correctness and the running time of this part follows immediately.
We have now established that MRIP = EXP ||poly−NEXP . To finish the proof of Theorem 1, we show that EXP ||poly−NEXP equals EXP ||NP , by a padding argument. The detailed proof is omitted here and can be found in the full version [13] .
Proof of Theorem 1. Theorem 1 follows immediately from Lemmas 6, 7, and 8.
SIMULATING MRIP USING TWO PROVERS AND FIVE ROUNDS
In this section we prove Theorem 2, that is, Theorem 2. MRIP = MRIP (2, 5) .
In particular, in Figure 5 , we show how to simulate any MRIP protocol (V, P ) with t(n) provers and p(n) rounds using a verifier V and two provers P 1 and P 2 . Recall that mij denotes the message exchanged between V and prover Pi in round j of their protocol. Essentially, V asks one prover to simulate all other provers in the original protocol, and uses a second prover to cross-check his answers.
Proof. Let (V, P ) be the MRIP protocol for a language L using P = (P1, . . . , P t(n) ) provers and p(n) rounds of communication. Let m denote the complete transcript of the protocol and mij be the message of prover Pi in round j of the protocol. We simulate this protocol using two provers P 1 and P 2 and verifier V in the protocol (V , P ) in Figure 5 . Let r denote the random coin flips used by V in protocol (V, P ).
To see the correctness of the protocol, notice that, (a) Even though V sends the random string r of V to P 1 , he uses a different random string r = r to select a message in Step 4. Thus, the expected payment to the provers depends on r , which is not known to them. (b) P 2 does not know r and essentially commits to a transcript m of (V, P ) in Step 5.
The provers can lie in the following ways, with the corresponding payments:
1. P 1 and P 2 do not commit to the same transcript m. Without loss of generality assume that, P 1 lies on some message in m. V catches this lie in Step 6a with probability
and gives a payment R = −1. 2. P 1 and P 2 agree on the transcript m, but m does not correspond to the best strategy profile in protocol (V, P ). In this case, they get a payment
, where R is the payment that the original protocol generates on this suboptimal transcript m. First of all, we can rule out Case 2 as a possible strategy of rational provers P 1 and P 2 . This is because V pays them according to the original protocol (V, P ). Committing to any dishonest transcript earns them a payment strictly less than the best possible. This follows from the correctness of the original MRIP protocol (V, P ). Now suppose P 1 lies on y > 0 messages in m -this corresponds to Case 1. The expected payment to P 1 would then be
where the last inequality is because R ≤ 1 and y ≥ 1. Thus, it is not rational for P 1 to lie on any message in m and the result follows.
Remark 2. If we allow 3 provers instead of 2, then the verifier only needs to interact with each prover exactly once. In particular, V sends r to P 3 instead of P 1 . This property may be desirable for applications that do not allow repeated interactions (e.g., each prover may be available only for a limited amount of time).
Optimal number of rounds.
We conclude this section with a discussion on the optimal number of rounds required to capture the full power of MRIP. It is well known that MIP can be simulated using two provers and one round [15] , which is clearly optimal. It would be interesting to obtain a similar result for MRIP. Note that, because we count the number of rounds differently (provers' messages and verifier's queries are considered to be separate rounds) and we assume the first round of messages are always from the provers, any non-trivial MRIP protocol with at least two provers requires at least three rounds. Indeed, in less than three rounds, the verifier cannot cross-check answers with the second prover (beyond the initial messages received from them), in which case the protocol reduces to a single-prover protocol.
Currently, the protocol in Figure 5 requires two extra rounds because the verifier's queries to each prover are not parallel. The verifier uses the answers from its query to Prover 1 to form its query to Prover 2. Getting rid of this dependency may result in a 2-prover 3-round protocol for MRIP. Interestingly, note that our protocols for NEXP and coNEXP only require 3 rounds (Section 2.1), so we know NEXP ∪ coNEXP ⊆ MRIP(2, 3). We leave the following closely related problems open for future study: (1) what is the optimal number of rounds required to capture the full . 
UTILITY GAPS IN MRIP
In our MRIP protocols until now, the provers are sensitive to arbitrarily small losses in the payment (similar to RIP in [5] ). In [6] the authors strengthen their model by requiring the prover deviating from the honest protocol to suffer a nonnegligible loss in their received payment (either constant or polynomial). This loss is demanded for any deviation from the prescribed behavior (i.e., the optimal strategy) and not just for reporting an incorrect answer to the membership of the input.
Formally, lets be the optimal strategy profile ands * a suboptimal strategy profile of P . Then the ideal utility gap requires that u(s) − u(s * ) > 1/α(n), where α(n) is constant or polynomial in n. Although an ideal utility gap strongly guarantees that the prover uses his optimal strategy, as pointed out by [25] , such a utility gap appears to be too strong to hold for many meaningful protocols.
To provide some intuition about the ideal utility gap, consider the MRIP protocol for NEXP given in Figure 2 . This protocol does not satisfy the ideal utility gap condition, even though at first glance the gap appears to be significant. Indeed, the provers who report the incorrect answer always have a constant utility gap. However, a prover may tell the truth about the membership of x but deviate slightly from the optimal strategy. For example, the prover could lie so that the verifier accepts with probability 1 − ε, where ε is exponentially small in |x|. In this situation, the verifier may have an exponentially small probability of detecting the deviation, and the expected payment would decrease by an exponentially small amount.
The difficulty in achieving the ideal gap can be seen in previous work as well. For example, the rational proof for MA in [6] fails to satisfy this constraint. Guo, Hubáček, Rosen and Vald in [25] also echo the concern about the ideal utility gap being strong and define a weaker notion of utility gap. However, they impose it on rational arguments rather than rational proofs, and they still consider a single prover. They also require that noticeable deviation leads to noticeable loss: if under a strategys of the prover, the probability for the verifier to output the correct answer is noticeably smaller than 1, then the expected payment to the prover unders is also noticeably smaller than the optimal expected payment. While we do not impose this requirement, our notion of utility gap as defined below implies it, but not vice-versa.
In particular, our notion allows us to encompass both the protocol in [6] and the NEXP protocol in Figure 2 . Intuitively, we require that the provers who report the membership of the input incorrectly suffer noticeable loss in their received payment.
Definition 5 (Utility Gap). Let L be a language in MRIP, (V, P ) an MRIP protocol for L,s the strategy profile of P that maximizes the expected payment, and c the first bit sent by P1 according tos. For any other strategy profiles , let c be the first bit sent by P1 according tos . We say that (V, P ) has an α(n)-utility gap if, whenever c = c we have ErR(x, r, (V, P )(x, r,s))−ErR(x, r, (V, P )(x, r,s )) > 1/α(n).
We denote an MRIP protocol with an α(n)-utility gap as an α(n)-gap-MRIP protocol, and we shorten "polynomial in n" as poly(n). It is easy to see that the protocol for NEXP in Figure 2 has an O(1)-utility gap. Following the analysis of Lemma 1 we get the same for coNEXP. That is, We have shown that with an exponential utility gap, MRIP = EXP ||NP . We now characterize MRIP protocols with a polynomial utility gap as exactly the class of languages decided by a polynomial-time oracle Turing machine with non-adaptive access to an NEXP oracle. That is, Theorem 3. poly(n)-gap-MRIP = P ||NEXP .
The proof of Theorem 3 uses similar ideas as that of Lemma 7 and can be found in the full version [13] .
Remark 3. There is a tradeoff between the utility gap and the computational efficiency in the two MRIP protocols we constructed for NEXP: the protocol in Figure 2 has a constant utility gap, but it relies on the standard MIP protocol; the protocol in Figure 3 is very efficient, but it only has an exponential utility gap. It would be interesting to see if there exists an MRIP protocol for NEXP that has a noticeable utility gap and is (almost) as efficient as the protocol in Figure 3 .
